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1. Introduction 
Some years ago two platitudes seem to have dominated the discourse over post-communist 
countries. One was the claim ’transition is over’, and the second was a highly optimistic 
assessment of growth potentials, current and future alike (Piatkowski 2013). It was customary to 
attribute next to miraculous features to the accession to the European Union. EU membership 
was seen basically as a growth engine (Stojkov – Zaldueno 2011) leading to by and large 
unconditional convergence on the ground, not just in models. 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its aftermath of slow and uncertain recovery (more 
in: Farkas ed. 2013), with sustaining fiancial instability in and around the Euro-zone, have raised 
doubts about the future of the new member states (NMS). While few analysts would doubt the 
validity of overall strategy of global integration and Europeanization, thorough analyses have 
raised doubts against the sustainability of the catching up scenario. Despite the diversity of 
strategies and policy options taken by the individual countries concerned, a common thread 
emerged in the deep drilling of country startegies. Namely: the questioning of the sustainability 
of the growth model followed in the preceding two decades has come to the fore. This holds for 
both resource rich Russia (Akindinova et al. 2013), and resource-poor, open and thus vulnerable 
central Europe (Marer 2013; dell’Anno – Villa 2013).  
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The underlying finding across the differences in terms of initial conditions, policy blunders, 
institutional imperfections, weak state capacity and often less than optimal interaction with the 
external world, especially with the European Union, is the following insight. It is not sufficient to 
attribute the slowdown of both potential and actual rates of growth to coincidental factors and 
policy mistakes. It is the entire model of growth which has reached its limits, once the one-time 
exogenous factors, such as the resource boom for Russia, or EU membership for the central 
European states, or peace building, democratic consolidation and Europeanization for Serbia ebb 
out. Endogenous factors and more of the same options, i.e. incremental if any improvement of 
the institutional infrastructure, continuation of populist policies of the past decade and dodging 
the tasks of long term development simply fail to deliver, already during the current decade. 
 
2. Reforms? What Reforms? 
In a comparative analysis it is impossible to get into the petty detail of individual country 
experience, despite the fact that each story is quite different, the interaction of various 
stakeholders and the emergence of policy options continues to defy any attempt to put so 
different countries in the same basket. What we attempt to do is to show, that much like in the 
southern members of the European Union, reform zeal has ebbed out in the post-1997 period. 
Furthermore the state of finances remained fragile, especially if we consolidate public and 
private accounts. Third, the European Union failed to provide an efficient institutional and policy 
umberella, as was expected and theorized by many. While it is hardly a big surprise for the 
students and practitioners of EU affairs, it is exactly the opposite to which the optimistic 
expectations at the time of EU accession, i.e. roughly a decade ago were built, in both the 
markets and the policy-making and academic communities. 
Reforms that Never Happened. If one reads back the literature on the creation of the European 
Monetary Union (Cassel ed. 1998; Issing et al. 2001) it was quite clear, that introducing the 
single currency was not meant to be a simple change of monetary techniques, which translate 
into lower external funding costs for each of the participants, irrespective of the substance and 
quality of their respective domestic policies. The EMU was seen as a triggerer of reforms, 
especially in the Southern countries, where labor makret rigidities and the quality of state 
regulation was seen as inadequate for EMU membership. 
By the time of accession it was clear for the NMS, that while the specific tasks emanating from 
the heritage of the Soviet empire were by and large mastered, the more difficult tasks of creating 
sustaining growth and manageable welfare systems was yet to be arranged (more on these in 
Kolodko ed. 2003). This was much in line with the emerging new developmental discourse of 
the World Bank, stressing the need for environmental, social and institutional settings, political 
participation as well as domestic ownership of reforms (replacing the one-size-fits-all solutions 
of the earlier decades). 
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To cut a long story short, those insights – which are to be seen as valid even from today’s 
perspective – never materialized. Neither in the South, nor in the East of the old continent could 
we observe deep going structural reforms, which would have paved the way for sustainable 
growth and solid public finances. In a way, the global crisis of 2008-2009 just shed the limelight 
on the weknesses, on dodging of changes, and on minimalism that characterized policy-making 
in much of Europe. 
Half-Hearted Consolidation of Finances. It was taken for granted, both in the theory and the 
practical arrangements of the EMU, that financial sustainability is a side condition for growth. 
Quite apart from EMU and accession or non-accession, solid finances were seen to be a must (as 
Sweden or Denmark, two non-EMU members, or Estonia and Latvia, two latecomers indicate).  
There were several problems with this per se valid insight. First, the focus was exclusively on 
public finance. In reality, especially in countries with deep financial intermediation, private 
sector debt – both of corporate and household sectors – can be and often are bigger, than that of 
the public sector. While Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact focused on public finance, 
private flows were often neglected. 
It is well known – especially with the benefit of hindsight – that private sector debt could and did 
explode – in the US subprime crisis just as much as in the case of Greek and Irish banks and 
Estonian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Latvian households. Lack of control and management of 
private flows has proven to be a major weakness. 
But also in the realm of public finance, efforts were less than satisfactory. Consolidation efforts 
in most of Western Europe eased up upon entry in the EMU. Years of relatively high growth 
showed no improvement of debt/GDP ratios. In the postcommunist region only Hungary 
followed this path of drifting. In other countries public finances were strictly managed, but 
private sector debt exploded in an uncontrolled fashion. As the saga of the debt crisis of the 
Southern countries unfolds, it is becoming increasingly reminescent of the NMS story, where 
public and private debt co-evolves (when one declines the other grows, see Győrffy 2013: 117-
126) thus a joint assessment is due. In short: the structure of consolidation was quite poor, in 
both the East and the South.  
The EU is Anything But a Growth Engine. This claim may sound as trivial for some, but we have 
to remember, that accession to the EU has triggered inflated expectations. First, it was believed, 
that the NMS will try to catch up with old members in terms of institutional infrastructure, as 
this follows from the logic of deepening integration. Also it is in their own best interest to adopt 
better quality arrangements and use external funding for it. A second related expectation was that 
of the convergence game. It was believed that for small open economies like the NMS it is 
straightforward to opt for quick euro-adoption, for the well known economic advantages of 
currency unions for small and vulnerable states in a volatile global economy. Furthermore more 
competition, less transaction costs, abolition of the exchange rate and interest rate risks, 
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individually and jointly should act as a mighty driver for adopting the single currency as soon as 
possible. This holds all the more so if countries – like all NMS except the Baltics – have their 
business cycles synchronized to the EU core, and also trade basically – up to 70 or 80% of their 
total turnover – with the core EU. A third related expectation was the hope for large multiplier 
effects of EU spending, especially cohesion spending. It is conceivable, that, provided cohesion 
investments are highly efficient, they trigger considerably more expansion of output and 
employment than their limited macro-economic significance would warrant. Finally, fourth, we 
may add the above cited perception of NMS becoming a new growth pole of Europe. If we were 
to believe neoclassical models, backwardness is also a potential for accelerated catching up, 
provided policies are right. Such expectations may become self-fulfilling. Also mechanistic 
extrapolations would yield highly optimistic scenarios. Foreign investors are known for their 
herd behavior. Also, fifth, one could have expected synergies across the four factors and pairs of 
thsoe we listed above. 
It remains still much of a puzzle – despite the deep drilling in the country studies we cited at the 
onset of this paper – why the convergence game has not materialized and why all major NMS 
remained outside the framework of the EMU. None of the five potentials have been utilized. This 
was due, in part, to the nature of EU spending, focusing on less efficient areas. It was re-inforced 
by the sobering that followed the financial crisis, and in part because of the minimalism in terms 
of policy and institutional reforms. Let us add: the EU, on its side, was pre-occupied with its own 
crisis and its management, thus fell short of providing an effective umbrella against the storm of 
the global financial markets, against the de-leveraging of banks, against a turn to overall 
pessimism in terms of growth potential of the NMS (Csaba 2014: Ch. 4).  
The Crisis of Crisis-Management. Abstractly seen any crisis is also an opportunity. In a way, the 
Great Depression bred Keynesianism cum incremental free trade, which helped the successful 
reconstruction of Europe in 1950-70s. The crises of the 80s and 90s have triggered major reforms 
of the welfare states, which saved them from demolition or bankruptcy. The collapse of the 
Soviet Empire allowed some post-communist countries to join European integration (more on 
these in Berend 2008). 
By contrast, management of the crisis in Europe- and particularly in NMS – followed the 
command of the day and lacked any vision for the future. Fiscal consolidation – if it happened at 
all – was done in an ad-hoc manner. In other cases, such as in the Czech Republic , Slovakia, 
Poland, Lithuania we see sustainingly high deficits over the 3% limit even at times of growth 
(ECB 2013: 45).  
Similarly to countries of the South and France, we see little if any sign of policies that would aim 
at reinvigorating growth via mobilizing long term factors as trust, transparency, high levels of 
research and development or improved institutional infrastructure. This is bad news unless we 
are strong believers of the unconditional convergence of the neoclassical type. Else growth is 
unlikely to be forthcoming and potenatial rates of growth are likely to fall, along with the rest of 
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the European Union (Halmai – Vásáry 2010; Halmai – Elekes 2013).The alternative would 
require, i.a. higher savings, more focus on tradables and improved institutions.  
However, as the two papers, relying on rich statistics and complex econometric modelling 
indicate, the situation has already changed dramatically, and way before the financial shock of 
2008-2009. While in the 1997-2007 decade growth potential of the NMS was 2.5 to 2.7% above 
that of the EU-15, that is about 4.0 to 4.5% per year, this situation has changed by now. 
Convergence of potential growth is already well underway, thus the common denominator, for 
both old and new Europe, is likely to be around the range of 1 percentage point per annum. If we 
consider, that according to the ECB statistics cited above, the growth rate of the Euro-zone 
declined from 2.7% per annum in 1996-2000 to a mere 1.2% in 2001-2010, accelerating slightly 
in 2011 to 1.5%, but declining in 2012 by 0.7% and in 2013 by another 0.7%, this is not a bold 
statement. The combined GDP of the NMS is around the tenth of total EU, thus the 1 pc pa 
forecast is in line with what any serious macro forecast could have. Obviously, under the 
customary ‘no policy change scenario’. Else: it is the wake-up call for those who believe in 
automatic improvements with the time passing.  
As evidenced by the procrastination with the management of the European debt crisis (Tanzi, 
2013), the slowdown is imminent, while the financing options for a more robust scenario are 
unlikely to be brought about. Not least, because public finances continue to be pre-occupied with 
compensation of losses, as evidenced by the European Stability Mechanism and the bond 
purchase program of the ECB, rather than with re-tailoring expenditure priorities in line with 
the needs top foster growth. The latter would require more spending on education, in the place of 
the cuts, which reign from the UK to Hungary. It would require more investment in R+D, rather 
than keeping those budgets below 1% of GDP in NMS and at 1.4% of GDP in the EU average, 
or half of the Lisbon target, and a third of what the USA or Japan spends in relative terms. Public 
investments, if any, tend to go to the energy production and social safety net. The pro-growth 
alternative is creating harsh incentives to save energy and move established patterns of 
production and consumption- including households – to less energy intensive uses. Knowing the 
political economy behind those practices, however, does not exempt from the ramifications of an 
allocation pattern, which is clearly not in line with efficiency and competitiveness 
considerations, therefore is technically unable to overcome stagnation through more robust 
growth. 
 
3. Needed: A New Political Economy for Europe?  
The therapy starts with telling what should not be expected, and then – relying on findings, 
generated basically by development economics – elaborate some lines whereby sustainable 
growth could be generated in the NMS. In so doing we may offer just a rudimentary draft of a 
6 
 
 
new growth model, since elaboration of the latter would call for a monograph rather than a 
conference paper. 
Elaborating the new options we first have to reject the ‘received widom’ of various sorts, that 
come from the academe and the policy-making circles. One is the unjustified hope for real 
convergence only by virtue of being underdeveloped. Let us stress: the models which do show 
convergence rely on a series of strong assumptions which can not be taken for relevant in the 
NMS, such as free and flexible pricing, free flow of factors, high efficiency of financial 
intermediation and lack of distortions. The second ‘recieved wisdom’ is that the EU somehow 
will take care of the difficulties, as it is an institutionally superior organization. While the latter is 
certainly true, let us recall two basic counter-arguments. First, the EU has been growing by a 
mere 1.4% in the 2001-2010 period, followed by a growth of 1.6% in 2011, and a contraction of 
0.3% in 2012, with a further drop of 0.7% in 2013 (the euro-zone performing actually even 
weaker, see ECB 2013: 39). This is anything but galvanizing. Second, the EU is not a 
developmental integration. The EMU is though welfare enhancing, but crisis management – 
setting up the ESM baiulout fund, and the bond market activities of the ECB – are all aimed at 
managing the business cíycle, not of generating growth. Cohesion spending accounts to a mere 
0.46% of joint GNI, or roughly 1% of fiscal activity, with other items going to farming, 
immigration, environmental protection and others. In sum, the sheer size of EU funds precludes 
them to be the triggeres of growth at the macro level. 
A third item of the recieved wisdom is the assumption: once the crisis is over, things will be back 
to normal (i.e. on the pre-crisis track). This is a fallacy on a number of grounds. First, a post-
crisis scenario may be quite different from the antecendents, in terms of patterns and incentives. 
Second, the pre-crisis period was one of inflated expectations in terms of catching up, investors 
had an upbeat mood even at times, when data would have called for a different behavior. Third-
de-leveraging – i.e. disengagement of foreign banks – is an ongoing process, which will be 
exacerbated by the over-cautious regulations of Basel Three. Fourth, the pre-crisis period was 
one of cheap money coupled with optimism. By now, money for NMS is no longer cheap and the 
mood is pessimistic. Fifth, as a result, pre-crisis rates were way beyond historic levels but also 
above trend rates of growth. Potential growth in the region is likely to be way below the 
customary expectation and nowhere close to a catchup scenario (Halmai – Vásáry 2010). 
A fourth item is that of complaceny. EU membership for most governments implies that 
homework is done, no additional effort is reuired to upgrade institutional infrastructure. This is 
plainly wrong, as evidenced by the lack of recovery following the end of the global financial 
storm. But arrangements – and policies – are likely to survive as long as in a media democracy 
complex issues of growth deceleration can not be meaningfully discussed in the fora that 
influence most voters.Thus the pressure to change is likely to remain limited, while the incentive 
to do nothing and leave most or all unpopular measures to your successor is strong. 
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In short, as any therapy, improvement begins with sincere, sober talk, taking account of the 
situation, and accepting the need for change (or the vices and dangers of doing noting). It is hard 
to say what level of crisis-consciousness is ‘optimal’ for a change. But it is clear: too much of 
crisis is laming –as it does in the Mediterranean countries. By contrast, lack of crisis feeling was 
at the root of drifting in NMS in the post-2004 period. 
When this is accepted, the possibility for a new political economy approach emerges. This 
implies, that one gives up the futile hope of finding a solution in the current mainstream, as long 
as it continues to be void of instituions and remains highly disinterested in policy applications. 
Therefore the approach must be political economy, where decision-making, persuasion, 
communication, and the change of incentives are all part and parcel of the analytical frame as 
well as of the implementation project. New is the political economy insofar as it appreciates the 
relvance of quantitative analyses, as it does not intend to replace inherent logic of the private 
economy with political mobilization, with externally imposed values, or other extraneous 
considerations. In so doing development economics, both the orthodox line (Rodrik – 
Rosenstzweig eds. 2010) and the less conventional version (Szentes 2011) can be instructive.  
Following the tradition of continental economics, the relevance of some old insights comes to the 
fore. Rule of law and security of private property rights. Crisis management in EU countries, 
including core EU states like the UK and the Netherlands included enhanced state 
interventionism, up to the point of nationalizations. This has created the false impression, in parts 
of the profession and in policy-making circles alike, as if property rights were unimportant, as if 
the usual assumption – used for convenience in introductory macro courses - of the irrelevance 
of this institution were a fact of life. What is true, under strong assumptions, and under a general 
equilibrium framework, however does not hold in the real world situations. It is hardly by 
chance, that nationalized units – like Fortys – or banks with heavy sate bailouts – like Societé 
Generale and the German regional banks, as well as the Spanish caxa, the local savings’ co-
operatives, – have not improved their fiancial results considerably. By contrast Goldman Sachs 
and many other US institutions have long retuned public money and are back to profitable 
operation. 
Managing the crisis may well have, on occasion, required swift actions, often transcending pre-
existent legal arrangements. However, it is dangerous to conclude that the latter constitute 
‘normalcy’ in the new era. Traditionally, such attempts have been strong in France, Spain, 
Greece and Italy, but this should not lead NMS to emulate bad practices. The more they are 
reliant on more savings and investment – as we indicated above – the more they need 
transparency of governmental operations and generally rule of law across the board. While 
individual actions of arbitrary interference may get unpunished at first, if interventionism 
becomes systemic.The latter has yielded low growth already in the past.  
While it may sound trite to the layman, it is heretic for the (mainstream) economist to claim that 
money matters. Moreover it is vital for sustaining robust rates of economic expansion, quite 
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contrary to the discussions in formal theoretical models, mostly void of money and thus of 
monetary institutions. Financial intermediation need to bee deepened and allocational efficiency 
improved. The more we believe that electoral preferences do not allow for a major increase of 
investments as a share of GDP in NMS, the more relevance we may allot to financial 
intermediation. For the time being stock exchanges are thin, and bank-deleveraging is going on. 
Intermediation costs are generally high and competition in banking quite restricted. This does not 
allow for major, market-driven restructuring.  
The devil of politics, exorcised by Samuelson and his disciples, comes back through the window. 
More recent studies in broader developmental theory are unanimous about the pivotal need of 
participatory decision-making and of democratic accountability as being major guarantees for 
sustainability of any project with a life span over a year or two, be that in irrigation, town 
planning or health care. Democracy, human rights and participation are not impediments, but 
constituents of sustainable growth. While the past decade has produced a wealth of sources on 
the relevance of economic freedoms, it is more of an open question if political freedoms also are 
important for sustined development. Joining a number of other authors Gerring et al. (2011) 
argue as follows. A democratic arrangement is more of a guarantee of sustaining policies than 
the tranditionally postulated autocratic government. If for no other reason, because of the nature 
of the reforms that matter: regional development, schooling, pensions, environment, health care 
are all areas where the time span of measures to take effect is measured in decades. By contrast, 
if the easy way is open –as int he case of resource rents, particularly relevant for the economies 
of new independent states as Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but also in the broader 
developing world, the temptation to redistribute rather than reform may prevail (Tsui 2011). 
Indeed, as evidenced the postcommunist cases referred to above, the ossification of vertical 
management structures survives indeed until the last minute, even if this outcome is anything but 
pre-determined. As a rule, institutions are the independent variable in the equation, but in other 
circumstances, as seen above, the reverse causality may work out. 
This line of thought has also been internalized by most international agencies, as the OECD, or 
the European Union proper, calling for more participation in order to ensure the social 
acceptance of economically needed/efficient larger projects. Domestic ownership implies also 
that it is the local elites, and preferably also large parts of society, who must be internally 
committed to the basic ideas and values embedded in the reforms to come, such as transparency, 
sustainability, inter-generational equity and environmental quality.  
The more we move away from imminent measures of financial stabilization and move towards 
structural and institutional reform, the less relevant the speed of decisions become, and the more 
their quality and sustainability which counts. Educational or pension reforms can not rationally 
and efficiently changed in each electoral cycle, nor can health care or regional development be 
re-tailored by the week.Thus frequency of changing legislation is a good inverse indicator of its 
quality.  
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4. Accounting for the Non-Accountable 
While most standard anayses of catching up potential is done int he form of growth accounting, 
the considerations above already foreshadow the enhanced relevance of non-quantifyable factors 
for both policy formation and outcomes. Let us address some of those factors which are 
growingly, if not yet universally, appreciated in a large body of the literature! 
Independence, efficacy and legitimacy of the judiciary are vital. The less the government can and 
should act as a referee among competing interests, the more relevant organized and civilized 
dispute settlement becomes. While nobody would expect litigation to become as much of an 
everyday phenomenon in Europe as it is in the USA, it goes without saying that the currently 
often practised ‘might is right’ renders NMS as ‘the Wild East’ or robber capitalism for many 
observers and participants. 
We do not venture over political science territories to explain why checks and balances are vital 
for any civilized society. What matters from our perspective is the vast relevance of the judicial 
system in shaping the type of capitalism that emerges (Acemoglou – Robinson 2012). In short, 
this is the decentralized way of managing conflict, often supported by shortcuts as arbitration and 
reliance on the lex mercatoria, or a series of customary arrangements that emerged in maritime 
trading practice since the middle ages. 
What is most important for the NMS perspective is to avoid slipping into rule by law, which was 
a feature of the Soviet system. As distinct from rule of law this implies the instrumental view of 
law as a form of exerting political leverage, rather than a set of rules of the game that binds even 
the legislator. While it is a matter of custom, tradition and governance style if the checks and 
balances rely more on the Constitutional Court, as in Germany, or on the Supreme Court, as in 
the USA, the basic issue is clear. Namely: that counterweights to the executive are needed, as 
well as arrangement s that allow for decentral management of economic and social conflict, 
without reliance on any level of the executive. The latter is oftentimes one of the parties, in its 
capacity as an – economic and political – stakeholder.  
In the longer run components of social psychology, such as trust, credibility, calculability, 
transparency gain in importance. While rule of law is a kind of minimum, these factors, 
especially in the longer run, are added to the unwritten rules of the game. As a matter of fact, in 
the majority of cases, people and firms do not turn to courts, not even to public offices. They 
manage their affairs horizontally. 
It is one of the commonplaces of business literature to observe, that the longer is a contract, the 
less is the binding power. The more we move North, the shorter are the contracts, and more is the 
implicit binding power which goes with it. Modern lean management is built on relationships of 
trust, even active co-operation, consultation and team work, feedbacks and voluntary assistance. 
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This presupposes a social climate where all those informal institutions and incentives may 
emerge and function.  
We need to underscore the relevance of those soft factors against several trends observable also 
in the NMS. First, there is a tendency, emanating from textbook economics, where anything non-
measurable is ascribed to poetry, which is nice but not very relevant, especially not for decision-
making. Second, populism in politics – shaped to some degree by needs of the mass media with 
the 40 second clip in evening news - tends to look for simple, even simplistic solutions with 
immediate effect. The above listed socio-psychological factors are not those. Third, it may even 
seem that adhering to those considerations may be positively harmful to decision-makers, 
rendering their rule clumsy, inefficient and often contrary to their percieved interest or prestige. 
Fourth, these factors breed harvest only in the long run, and Keynes is frequently misquoted to 
discredit that. While Keynes was in favor of swift action during crisis, he also advocated 
symmetry in public finance, which does take care of the events of 5 to 10 years. Likewise, if one 
thinks of capitalism as a system where wealth and cultural supremacy can, and also tends to be, 
bequeathed, short-termism is something truly pre-capitalist. 
Indeed, as known both from sociology and business studies, the more complex is a task or an 
organization, the higher the relevance of these soft non-material factors against measurable 
items, such. Reputation is a well-deserved brand name in business for the sum of the immaterial 
values accumulated over decades and under different conditions.If one thinks about the 
reputation of universities, from Oxford to Harvard, publishers, from Palgrave to Nomos, or 
Nobel winners in any discipline in any time, it becomes clear: the impact of Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez can not and should not be measured by the number of his lines, the thickness of his 
books, or actually any quantitative indicators, including the revenue he might have generated 
over the decades of his activity as a writer.  
Indeed, reputatiuon – also in the conduct of business – is an immaterial and immeasurable value, 
with overriding significance over the measurable, quantifyable items, which serve as a base for 
preparing, rather than taking the final decision.This applies to finance, investment, and most of 
all personnel decisions.True, as Lazear and Shaw (2007) explain, this qualitative assessment is 
balanced with organizational choices and quantitative assessment of the perceived/expected 
contribution, in terms of income generation but most of all, fitness to the task (yet another 
qualitative criterion used in business practice). 
We may thus add yet another non-measurable, non-material, non-quantifyable factor, which has 
gained prominence in the global discourse on development: this is the quality of governance. It is 
well known, that the World Bank and in their footsteps many other organizations attempted to 
‘put numbers’ on the quality of governance. For any pratical purposes – other than publishability 
in a mainstream journal – these efforts have remained futile. 
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Therefore it is quite important to appreciate: quality of governance is a single, over-arching, 
subjectively set indicator, which is easy to lose and difficult to gain. Quality of governance 
implies ability to react to unforseen events, reatain integrity, being able to think of the common 
good and many others.  
Good governance therefore does not lend itself to quantitative assessment. But it is being 
assessed, by investors, the electorate, the press, and common people coming to each country. It is 
certainly much more than lack of corruption, lack of predation, lack of authoritarianism, or just 
following procedural norms of the country and the EU alike. 
Finally mention should be made of the new categories that emerged over the past two decades in 
developmetal discourse and matter for the NMS. These include state capacity, i.e. if the 
government is able to deliver. Not just to pass nice laws, but to act accordingly, with sticks and 
carrots. State capture is perhaps more extensive in the New Independent States than in NMS, but 
it would be hard to deny: on occasion business groups and other vested intersts could influence 
major governmental decisions. The more we think both dimensions need improvement, the 
higher we appreciate the particpatory elements, the local ownwership component discussed 
above. The reversal of secularist and industrializing, opening up policies in much of the Middle 
East and North Africa had to do with the inability of those states to improve on those counts. 
One may speculate, how much tradition is to blame for this (Lane 2011), but the bottom line is 
the lack of improvement. 
What makes the parallel relevant for NMS is that all surveys – Eurobarometer, World Value 
Survey and output of local think tanks – are indicative of a large degree of disillusionment in 
post-communist societies. Disinterest in public affairs is on the rise, especially among the young. 
The rise of extremist movements – in old and new EU members – is a clear sign of the 
estrangement that emerged between elite politics and popular concerns. 
 
5. Quality and Quantity 
In the preceding pages we attempted to present a new analytical framework for understanding the 
situation in the NMS as well as offering a framing for the policies that may induce higher growth 
in the region than current forecast would suggest. The two – analytical and normative – together 
add up to the new political economy, needed for development of the NMS. 
It is perhaps good to remind the reader: development and growth are no longer equated in the 
broad literature we cited. Development is measured primarily through the improvement of 
Human Development Indicators (HDI), more recently joined by various assessments of 
subjective well-being. The latter line of research emphasizes particularly the non-material 
components of advancement, such as satisfaction with one’s life, fulfillment in job, seeing a 
purpose for oneself and for the society in the future, caring about the environment and many 
12 
 
 
other items. While those continue to be excluded from economics education, even at the PhD 
level in the ‘global economics program’ of leading universities, this is no longer the case in the 
cutting edge social sciences. Well-being studies appear in leading US journals and major 
international organizations follow the developments in this field, not least through the surveys 
cited above.  
What is the point of de-emphasizing the measurable and returning to the tradition of appreciating 
the subjective in economic as well a sin business analysis? It seems that this turn may promise 
several advantages. First, as an analytical device it allows for a better understanding of complex 
systems, as the macro-economy of each new member-state is. Second: it brings economic 
analysis closer to the real world situation we wish to understand as part and parcel of our 
diagnostics. Third, it allows for better understanding of why political and economic rationalities 
departed in the past fifteen years, in old and new members alike. Fourth, it allows for 
appreciating the social side conditions of economic change in the full and in an integrated 
manner. 
Let us highlight: the new in our political economy approach is not that we bring back the socio-
political, as used to be customary in economics until the 1990s. What is new is internalizing and 
integrating the social as part of both the expalnatory power (via incentives) and the success 
indicators (via sustainability) of the economic agenda.  
What could be mastered under the given constraints of space and time was to provide a skeleton 
of a new approach. It provides a frame, which ideally should and could be filled with the flesh of 
individual country cases. Some of this work was presented in one of the twin volumes edited by 
Augustin Fosu (2012). However, most of it has been conluded before the financial and growth 
crisis. The more interesting further research could be to complement the cases of post-communist 
countries, and draw the nuanced conclusions on the ground of emprical evidence. But this would 
call for a multi-author volume, rather than a single paper. However, the four diagnostic and the 
seven therapeutic points may help create more productive and more relevant analyses of the 
processes than it had been customary so far.  
Bringing back the ’condition humane’ in economic analysis, as advocated above, has a series of 
implications for a variety of areas in terms of concepts, methods and communication of available 
economic knowledge. First: economic education should reflect, from the very outset, the new 
realities and academic considerations outlined above. Instead of copying the ‘global economics 
program’ (Fertő 2012), pyramids of knowledge and learning should be re-established, with broad 
general education laying the foundation for later specialization. In other words, there is an urgent 
need to reject the Bologna process and the ensuing standardization, in favor of the traditional, 
uniform five year economics and business (and IR and political science) programs. In each of 
these challenges peculiar to European societies – aging, environment, unemployment, lack of 
savings, transparency, multi-culturalism etc – should be addressed. 
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Second: communication of available – relevant, socially and politically relevant – economic 
insights should be fundamentally improved. By marginalizing the self-referential discourses the 
economics profession could assist improving the quality of public discourse and thereby the 
quality of public policies. Rather than allowing for the shallow and misleading debate on ‘how 
much austerity will be enough’ serious issues related to structural and welfare reforms and life-
long learning should be initiated and conducted in the broad public, including the new media. 
Third: evidence-based policy evaluation, both in terms of quatity and quality should become the 
rule. For instance, checking the propositions of political parties by independent private 
forecasting agencies, preferably from abroad, could help making the voters alert of the 
forsdeeable consequences of some choices. Even in this case unforseeable events may occur – 
and this should also be made clear. 
Fourth: realistic – if not always rtational – expectations can be formed only if truth-telling, both 
at the level of academic analysis and of policy discourses, as advocated inter alia by Grzegorz 
Kolodko (2011) were to become the standard. For well known reasons, we are a long way off 
from this maxim’ being heeded. But it is the mission of the academic to ring the bell whan the 
time of awakening has arrived. And – as we argued in the main body of the text – this has been 
the case in post-crisis Europe. 
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